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I.

INTRODUCTION

Delaware law is the leading source of non-federal law
1
governing U.S. business organizations. Over the past twenty-five
† Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; Founding
DirectorMitchell Fellows Program; A.B. Harvard College, 1972; J.D. Yale Law
School, 1979. Professor Kleinberger’s work depends, as always, on the love,
support, and insights of Carolyn C.S. Kleinberger.
1. Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 465, 476 (2009); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum,
and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 66–67 (2009) (“The
statistics reflecting Delaware’s dominance in the chartering business are subject
only to slight variation year to year. . . . Nearly sixty percent of the Fortune 500
companies and nearly the same proportion of those listed on the New York Stock
Exchange are Delaware corporations. In addition, seventy percent of initial public
offerings in 2004 on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange,
and the NASDAQ were Delaware corporations. Moreover, . . . ninety-seven
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years that law has tilted further and further toward insulating
individuals who manage business firms from any liability to the
2
These
firms’ owners based on claims of incompetence.
developments have occurred both in corporate law and the law of
3
unincorporated organizations.
These developments in Delaware law are often described as
4
consistent with market principles, but excessive protection of firm
5
managers undercuts the proper functioning of a market system.
Effective competition among firms does not require a “dog eat dog”
mentality within firms. Managerial responsibility is a prerequisite to
6
healthy firms, which in turn are a prerequisite to a healthy market
percent of all U.S. public companies incorporate either in their home state or in
Delaware. For firms choosing to incorporate outside their home state, eighty-five
percent choose Delaware, and in total, Delaware accounts for fifty-eight percent of
all U.S. public company charters. Consistent with these statistics, though scholars
disagree about the reasons for and the impact of Delaware’s success, its
preeminence as the purveyor of nationally-relevant corporate law is beyond
dispute.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)).
2. In the unincorporated realm, the insulation can extend to the duty of
loyalty as well. See infra Part V. That issue is largely beyond the scope of this essay,
which primarily considers insulation from claims for incompetence.
3. For an interesting assertion that, according to Delaware’s constitution,
the Delaware legislature cannot do what it has emphatically stated it is doing (i.e.,
authorize private agreements to eliminate fiduciary duty), see Lyman Johnson,
Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701 (2011).
4. Manesh, supra note 1, at 470 (“[C]ontractarians argue, on freedom of
contract principles, that corporate law should permit shareholders to waive or
modify the fiduciary duties of their corporate managers.”); see also, e.g., Larry E.
Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the Delaware Limited Partnership and Its Implications
for Corporate Law, 16 J. CORP. L. 299, 302–10 (1991) (analyzing and advocating an
opt-out provision for corporations).
5. U.S. law lacks an umbrella term to encompass directors of a corporation
as well as those with the highest authority in various unincorporated enterprises.
This paper uses the word “manager” to indicate those persons who collectively (or,
if only one person, solely): (1) determine important policies for an enterprise; (2)
superintend the enterprise’s overall operations; and (3) exercise ultimate and, as
appropriate, active control over matters of key strategic importance to the
enterprise. In this sense, directors of a corporation are managers, as are the
general partners of a limited partnership, the managers of a manager-managed
limited liability company, and the members of a member-managed limited liability
company.
6. See Surendra Arjoon, Virtue Theory as a Dynamic Theory of Business, 28 J. BUS.
ETHICS 159 (2000) (arguing that companies using ethically driven strategies
perform better financially than those that use profit-driven strategies); see also
Gabriel Flynn, The Virtuous Manager: A Vision for Leadership in Business, 78 J. BUS.
ETHICS 359 (2008) (arguing for application of Aristotelian ethics to business
management); Franco Gandolfi, The Impact of Leadership on Health—A Preliminary
Discussion, 11 REV. INT’L COMP. MGMT. 222, 225–26 (2010), available at
http://www.rmci.ase.ro/no11vol2/Vol11_No2_Article5.pdf (“[A] firm needs to
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7

economy.
This essay explores the decay in “personal responsibility” of
managers under the Delaware law of business organizations and
argues that one small but necessary way to restore confidence and
effectiveness to the U.S. economy is to restore some minimum level
of competence accountability for those who manage other people’s
8
money.
Part II states the principles of political economy and law that
shape this essay’s analysis. Part III harks back to Adam Smith to
make the point that managers insulated from personal liability tend
toward irresponsible behavior. Part III also finds modern support
for this notion across a wide spectrum of U.S. law and legal
thinkers. Part IV describes the decay in personal responsibility
under the Delaware corporate law applicable to directors, and Part
V describes the even greater decay in the Delaware law on
unincorporated business organization.
Part VI notes the
contemporary profusion of manuals, guides, and exhortations
urging responsible, competent director behavior but argues that,
with liability for incompetence almost a dead issue, all the
exhortations in the world will not work.
Part VII explains the conceptual violence that Delaware has
inflicted on basic entity law concepts and asserts that better liability
have a healthy mindset and a deep care for individual, group, and organizational
health in order to build and secure a competitive edge for the future.”); Eliot
Spitzer, Strong Law Enforcement Is Good for the Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2005, at
A18, available at http://www.happinessonline.org/InfectiousGreed/p39.htm
(arguing that strong enforcement of laws benefits the economy).
7. See Robert Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social
Responsibility: Comprehending Corporate Wealth Maximization and Distribution for
Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1531 (2002) (advocating
inclusion of binary economics in corporate planning); Ben Bernanke, Nonmonetary
Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation Mechanism of the Great Depression, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 257 (1983) (discussing the role of bank failures in the 1930s
shutdown of the banking system); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the
Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The
Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (analyzing the fallout of
Enron’s bankruptcy); Kenneth Carling et al., Exploring Relationships Between
Firms’ Balance Sheets and the Macro Economy (Oct. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.atl-res.com/finance/financeconference/jacobson.pdf (explaining a
model of the interaction of financial and macro economies).
8. Obviously, the “Debacle of 2008” has multitudinous causes, many far
transcending the questions discussed here. For a recent and somewhat irreverent
assertion that public agencies played a major role, see J. Scott Colesanti, Laws,
Sausages, and Bailouts: Testing the Populist View of the Causes of the Economic Crisis, 4
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 175 (2010).
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rules could make use of the “best practices” admonitions to return
a semblance of personal responsibility to Delaware corporate and
unincorporated law. Part VIII notes that the alternative is
increasing federalization of corporate governance and thus
increasing over-regulation of the U.S. economy.
II. THE AUTHOR’S “PARTICULAR POINTS OF VIEW”
Max Weber, the great sociologist and social theorist, taught
that “[a]ll knowledge of cultural reality . . . is always knowledge
9
from particular points of view.” As a follower of Weber, I begin by
stating the principal points that comprise my view of this matter:
• I support the market economy, not as a perfect or ideal
mechanism, but rather in the same sense in which Winston
Churchill endorsed democracy:
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will
be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one
pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise.
Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst
form of Government except all those other forms
10
that have been tried from time to time.
• Market capitalism has its share of “sin and woe,” but
centralized control has a far worse record. Compare societies
that make economic decisions a species of political decision
with societies that feature private accumulation of capital,
private decision-making on how to deploy that capital, and an
essentially free market in the resulting goods and services.
The differences, throughout history, are substantial, not only
in terms of economic efficiency and efficacy but also in terms
of individual freedom.
• Market imperfections are inevitable, and wise and focused
regulations are thus supportive of a market system. However,
the more regulation shapes the process by which
entrepreneurs make entrepreneurial decisions, the greater is
the risk to the market system. It is one thing to decree
substantively that “no corporation may dump toxic waste in the
ground, water, or air.” It is quite another to control the
process by which corporations make all their decisions.
9. MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 81 (Edward A.
Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949).
10. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 154 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
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Regulations of the latter type (which are increasing in the
United States):
 relocate decision-making power away from firms to the
government;
 move the economy toward centralized control (no
matter how large GM may be, the U.S. government is
still larger); and
 shift decision-making away from individuals with
success-based
incentives
to
individuals
with
bureaucratic incentives.
• As a lawyer and law professor, I am a “practical formalist.” I
11
believe that legal constructs have practical meaning,
accumulated over time and with more or less steady usage. I
believe further that recent developments in the law of business
entities (especially in Delaware) have distorted some of these
fundamental constructs in the guise of serving the market.
• As a consequence of these views, I criticize changes in the
dominant state law of business organizations that (1) override,
distort, or reject longstanding legal constructs (2) so as to
effectively immunize incompetence in those who manage
other people’s property (3) with the inevitable result of calling
forth more and more federal regulation of business judgment.
III. LEARNING FROM ADAM SMITH: IRRESPONSIBILITY PRODUCES
IRRESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR
In his classic work The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith made an
important observation as to the relationship between manager risk
and manager competence. Smith was discussing the benefits and
detriments of joint stock companies (with limited liability) as
compared with private ventures (i.e., joint ventures and
partnerships), which at that time had unlimited liability. Smith
began by explaining why the joint stock company is a superior
mechanism for raising capital from the public:
In a private copartnery, each partner is bound for the
debts contracted by the company to the whole extent of
his fortune. In a joint stock company, on the contrary,
each partner is bound only to the extent of his share.
11. Practical formalism is thus quite different from what might be called a
theological formalism—i.e., the belief that some transcendental meaning inheres
in certain fundamental legal constructs.
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The trade of a joint stock company is always managed
by a court of directors. This court, indeed, is frequently
subject, in many respects, to the control of a general court
of proprietors. But the greater part of those proprietors
seldom pretend to understand anything of the business of
the company, and when the spirit of faction happens not
to prevail among them, give themselves no trouble about
it, but receive contentedly such half-yearly or yearly
dividend as the directors think proper to make to them.
This total exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond
a limited sum, encourages many people to become
adventurers in joint stock companies, who would, upon
no account, hazard their fortunes in any private
copartnery. Such companies, therefore, commonly draw
to themselves much greater stocks than any private
12
copartnery can boast of.
Smith then turned to the detriments of the joint stock system,
which have to do with the managers’ absence of risk:
The directors of such companies, however, being the
managers rather of other people’s money than of their
own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over
their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to
consider attention to small matters as not for their
master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a
dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion,
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the
13
management of the affairs of such a company.
Of course, in modern economies even partnerships have
14
liability shields for their owners, and virtually all economic activity
occurs through shielded entities. But Smith’s observation about
“negligence and profusion” remains relevant. That observation
extrapolates well to the increasing insulation from liability that
Delaware laws provide directors and other “managers . . . of other

12. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS bk. V, ch.1, pt. 3, art. 1, at 586 (Ward, Lock, & Tyler 1812) (1776).
13. Id. at 586–87.
14. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT §§ 102(9), 201(a)(4), 406(c) (2001) (providing for
limited liability limited partnerships with a shield for general partners); REVISED
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 306(c), 1001 (1997) (providing for limited liability
partnerships).
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15

people’s money.”
Moreover, it is a premise of modern U.S. law (outside the
business entities area, perhaps) that risk of civil liability conduces
individuals to careful behavior. Consider the following statements,
selected to reflect a wide range of areas of law and thereby illustrate
the prevalence of this risk-responsibility premise:
• “The availability of tort liability influences the behavior of
potential defendants. Product manufacturers have often
changed the design of their products to reduce risks, in an
effort to minimize their exposure to liability. In fact, one study
conducted by RAND in the early 1980s concluded that for
lightly regulated manufacturers, liability was the single greatest
factor influencing product design decisions.
Similarly,
professionals such as physicians engage in defensive practices
16
based on the threat of liability.”
• “If doctors know they can be sued for money damages,
presumably they will be more likely to practice medicine
17
carefully.”
• “Copyright laws define infringing behaviors (such as
unauthorized copying), and subject violators to liability. Thus,
the law shapes the behavior of users of information by
18
providing negative incentives for inefficient behavior.”
• “The affirmative defense [to supervisor sexual harassment],
which carves out an exception to a general rule of automatic
19
liability, shapes employers’ conduct.”
• “[T]here is at least anecdotal evidence that, at the domestic
level, liability claims pertaining to environmental harm have
led to changes in behavior, in particular when such claims
20
were directed against corporations (rather than states).”
15. SMITH, supra note 12, at 586.
16. Stephen P. Teret & Jon S. Vernick, Gambling with the Health of Others, 107
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 110, 112 (2009) (arguing for tort liability for
parents who fail to have their children vaccinated, thereby putting other children
at risk).
17. Hickman v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn. 1986)
(“Presumably, too, doctors try to be careful whether or not they can be sued. But
in an imperfect world, even with lawsuits, people will still be careless.”).
18. Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in CyberspaceRights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1155, 1157 n.5 (1998).
19. Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form
over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 8 (2003)
(alteration in original).
20. Michael G. Faure & André Nollkaemper, International Liability as an
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• “Civil liability under section 11 [of the Securities Act] and
similar provisions was designed not so much to compensate
the defrauded purchaser as to promote enforcement of the
Act and to deter negligence by providing a penalty for those
21
who fail in their duties.”
• “Under an ex ante conception, the function of the insurer’s
liability for bad faith [in responding to claims] is judged by the
manner in which the threat of liability will affect insurer
behavior. Under this conception, the threat of liability
functions to correct possible underenforcement and conflictof-interest problems. In first-party insurance, the cost to the
policyholder of bringing suit for breach of contract makes it
possible for the insurer to deny legitimate claims because the
traditional rules governing damages award the successful
claimant only the amount to which she is entitled under the
policy. By threatening insurers who wrongfully deny claims
with liability for extracontractual damages, bad faith liability
has the potential to correct such underenforcement: Any
benefit to be gained by denying a claim must be offset by the
additional liability the insurer will face if it is later found to
have denied the claim in ‘bad faith.’ . . . As an antidote to the
traditional view of civil liability as a system of corrective justice,
this modern way of thinking about civil liability from the ex
ante perspective has been extraordinarily useful. It has
encouraged judges and legal scholars to consider more
carefully what has always been obvious-that liability rules not
22
only compensate, but also deter.”
• “Although commentators disagree on which liability theories
will best accomplish these tort goals, virtually all social
engineering and ‘law and economics’ analyses share one
central behavioral assumption—that imposition of liability
substantially affects how categories of actors respond to the
23
risks they create or confront.”
• “Economists approach civil liability as a system of incentives
Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for Climate Change, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 123,
141 (2007).
21. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969)
(alteration in original).
22. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer’s Liability for Bad
Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1309, 1310–11 (1994) (alteration in original).
23. Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73
CAL. L. REV. 677, 677 (1985).
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designed to encourage or deter future behavior.”
• “[Section] 1983 [civil action for deprivation of rights under
the color of law] was intended not only to provide
compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a
deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as well.
The knowledge that a municipality will be liable for all of its
injurious conduct, whether committed in good faith or not,
should create an incentive for officials who may harbor doubts
about the lawfulness of their intended actions to err on the
side of protecting citizens’ constitutional rights. Furthermore,
the threat that damages might be levied against the city may
encourage those in a policymaking position to institute
internal rules and programs designed to minimize the
likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional
rights.
Such procedures are particularly beneficial in
preventing those ‘systemic’ injuries that result not so much
from the conduct of any single individual, but from the
interactive behavior of several government officials, each of
25
whom may be acting in good faith.”
As will shortly be shown, these precepts have no place in the
modern Delaware law of business organizations.
IV. THE DECAY OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN DELAWARE
CORPORATE LAW
Delaware law has always been careful about imposing liability
on corporate directors. Delaware states its duty of care as the
avoidance of “gross negligence” and uses the business judgment
rule to reinforce the protections against personal liability for
directors of Delaware corporations. Multi-volume treatises have
been written on the nuance of the business judgment rule, but
essentially the rule:
• obliges those with ultimate management authority to comply
with the duties of loyalty and care;
• recognizes that the duty of care has both a process aspect and
a substantive (or outcome) aspect but in ordinary
circumstances accords minimal importance to the outcome
24. June R. Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist
Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 954 (1991).
25. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651–52 (1980) (alteration in
original) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
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26

aspect ; and,
• presumes that those with management authority have met
their duties, thereby placing the burden of proof on
27
plaintiffs.
The business judgment rule is intended to free
entrepreneurial managers to take appropriate risks, which are
necessary to survival and profitability in the “dog eat dog” world of
the market. In 1982, in Joy v. North, Judge Ralph Winter wrote a
cogent explanation and defense of the business judgment rule:
While it is often stated that corporate directors and
officers will be liable for negligence in carrying out their
corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a statement is
misleading. Whereas an automobile driver who makes a
mistake in judgment as to speed or distance injuring a
pedestrian will likely be called upon to respond in
damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in
judgment as to economic conditions, consumer tastes or
production line efficiency will rarely, if ever, be found
liable for damages suffered by the corporation. Whatever
the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed
upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad
judgment[,] and this reluctance to impose liability for
unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally
labelled the business judgment rule. Although the rule
has suffered under academic criticism, it is not without
rational basis.
First, shareholders to a very real degree voluntarily
undertake the risk of bad business judgment. Investors
need not buy stock, for investment markets offer an array
of opportunities less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment
by corporate officers. Nor need investors buy stock in
particular corporations. In the exercise of what is
genuinely a free choice, the quality of a firm’s
management is often decisive and information is available
from professional advisors. Since shareholders can and
do select among investments partly on the basis of
26. Thus it is almost impossible to find an ordinary duty of care case in which
the directors used acceptable process but were found wanting for having
nonetheless achieved an unreasonably bad outcome. “When applying the duty of
care, courts focus their inquiry on management’s efforts in arriving at the decision
rather than on the wisdom of the decision itself.” 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036 (2002 & Supp.
2009–2010).
27. Id.

2012]

THE GLUE OF CAPITALISM

747

management, the business judgment rule merely
recognizes a certain voluntariness in undertaking the risk
of bad business decisions.
Second, courts recognize that after-the-fact litigation
is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business
decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate
decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years
later, since business imperatives often call for quick
decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect
information. The entrepreneur’s function is to encounter
risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision
at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years
later against a background of perfect knowledge.
Third, because potential profit often corresponds to
the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of
shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly
cautious corporate decisions. Some opportunities offer
great profits at the risk of very substantial losses, while the
alternatives offer less risk of loss but also less potential
profit. Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by
diversifying their holdings. In the case of the diversified
shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may
well be the best choice since great losses in some stocks
will over time be offset by even greater gains in others.
Given mutual funds and similar forms of diversified
investment, courts need not bend over backwards to give
special protection to shareholders who refuse to reduce
the volatility of risk by not diversifying. A rule which
penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus
may not be in the interest of shareholders generally.
Whatever its merit, however, the business judgment
rule extends only as far as the reasons which justify its
existence. Thus, it does not apply in cases, e.g., in which
the corporate decision lacks a business purpose, is tainted
by a conflict of interest, is so egregious as to amount to a
no-win decision, or results from an obvious and prolonged
failure to exercise oversight or supervision.
Other
28
examples may occur.
28. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted). The assertion that shareholders voluntarily undertake the risk
of bad judgment does not delineate the extent of that risk. For example, a
reasonable investor might well accept that even given a reasonable, business-like
approach to decisions, mistakes will sometimes occur while not accepting the notion that
decision makers should be insulated from liability even if their decision making process was
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We will return to the analogy of the careless driver in Part VII,
but for the moment let us add to Judge Winter’s views a recent
statement by E. Norman Veasey, former Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court:
[T]he taking of prudent risks by directors, acting in
accord with their state law fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty, is the engine of business strategy and is protected
by the business judgment rule. The business judgment
rule is alive and well, . . . and it animates state internal
corporate affairs law, as exemplified by Delaware court
29
decisions.
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court caused what seemed to
be a tectonic shift in the landscape of the business judgment rule,
30
In Smith v. Van Gorkom¸ a case
particularly the duty of care.
concerning a cash-out merger for an allegedly inadequate price,
the court agreed with the complaining shareholders that the
31
target’s directors—“all honourable men” —had abandoned their
duty of care. The target was Trans Union, and its CEO and board
chair, Jerome Van Gorkom, was the moving force behind the
approval. According to the Delaware Supreme Court:
The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as
to Van Gorkom’s role in forcing the “sale” of the
Company and in establishing the per share purchase
shoddy to the point of incompetence.
29. E. Norman Veasey, The Challenges for Directors in Piloting Through State and
Federal Standards in the Maelstrom of Risk Management, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 3
(2010).
30. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds
by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 715 n.54 (Del. 2009).
31. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2 (Antony’s funeral
oration). The Van Gorkom decision did not quote Shakespeare, but did note:
Trans Union’s five “inside” directors had backgrounds in law and
accounting, 116 years of collective employment by the Company and 68
years of combined experience on its Board. Trans Union’s five “outside”
directors included four chief executives of major corporations and an
economist who was a former dean of a major school of business and
chancellor of a university. The “outside” directors had 78 years of
combined experience as chief executive officers of major corporations
and 50 years of cumulative experience as directors of Trans Union.
Thus, defendants argue that the Board was eminently qualified to reach
an informed judgment on the proposed “sale” of Trans Union
notwithstanding their lack of any advance notice of the proposal, the
shortness of their deliberation, and their determination not to consult
with their investment banker or to obtain a fairness opinion.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 880 n.21.
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price; (2) were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the
Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at a
minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the “sale”
of the Company upon two hours’ consideration, without
prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or
emergency . . . .
[T]he Board based its September 20 decision to
approve the cash-out merger primarily on Van Gorkom’s
representations. None of the directors, other than Van
Gorkom and Chelberg, had any prior knowledge that the
purpose of the meeting was to propose a cash-out merger
of Trans Union. No members of Senior Management
were present, other than Chelberg, Romans and Peterson;
and the latter two had only learned of the proposed sale
an hour earlier. Both general counsel Moore and former
general counsel Browder attended the meeting, but were
equally uninformed as to the purpose of the meeting and
the documents to be acted upon.
Without any documents before them concerning the
proposed transaction, the members of the Board were
required to rely entirely upon Van Gorkom’s 20-minute
oral presentation of the proposal. No written summary of
the terms of the merger was presented; the directors were
given no documentation to support the adequacy of $55
price per share for sale of the Company; and the Board
had before it nothing more than Van Gorkom’s statement
of his understanding of the substance of an agreement
which he admittedly had never read, nor which any
32
member of the Board had ever seen.
Van Gorkom was exceedingly controversial.
One major
corporate law savant called the decision “one of the worst decisions
33
in the history of corporate law.” Another stated that the case was
“not only correctly decided, but is a sound precedent, reaffirming
the basic obligation of due care owed by corporate directors to
34
Critics contended that, so long as Van Gorkom
stockholders.”
remained the law, qualified directors would abandon their roles
almost en masse.
In any event, the Delaware legislature responded almost before
32. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
33. Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985).
34. William Prickett, An Explanation of Trans Union to “Henny-Penny” and Her
Friends, 10 DEL J. CORP. L. 451, 452 (1985).
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earthquake-like prophecies of doom began. As the Delaware
Supreme Court later explained:
In 1986, Section 102(b)(7) was enacted by the Delaware
General Assembly, following a “directors and officers
insurance liability crisis and the 1985 . . . decision [of this
Court] in Smith v. Van Gorkom.” In Van Gorkom, we held
that directors were personally liable in monetary damages
for gross negligence in the process of decisionmaking.
The purpose of Section 102(b)(7) was to permit share
holders—who are entitled to rely upon directors to
discharge their fiduciary duties at all times—to adopt a
provision in the certificate of incorporation to exculpate
directors from any personal liability for the payment of
monetary damages for breaches of their duty of care, but
not for duty of loyalty violations, good faith violations and
certain other conduct. Following the enactment of
Section 102(b)(7), the shareholders of many Delaware
corporations approved charter amendments containing
these exculpatory provisions with full knowledge of their
35
import.
The statement “with full knowledge of their import” is
remarkable because it would take more than twenty years for the
Delaware Supreme Court to reveal the true breadth and power of
36
The uncertainty—
section 102(b)(7)’s exculpatory provisions.
which eventually was resolved emphatically in favor of directors—
37
had to do with the exception for “good faith violations.” As will
be seen, that resolution effectively eliminated liability for
38
incompetence.
35. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001).
36. Moreover, it is questionable to what extent investors have viable choices
on such matters. Consideration of that very contentious issue is beyond the scope
of this essay, however.
37. Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90.
38. Arguably, the risk of such liability was never great. Writing in 1968,
Professor Joseph Bishop observed:
The hard fact is that cases in which directors of business corporations are
held liable, at the suit of stockholders, for mere negligence are few and
far between. As an uncommonly frank judge put it, “it is only in a most
unusual and extraordinary case that directors are held liable for
negligence in the absence of fraud, or improper motive, or personal
interest.” The observation was made 20-odd years ago but is still valid.
The ado about the liability of directors for mere negligence is like the
proverbial shaving of pigs—much squeal and little wool, at least for the
stockholders.
Joseph Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
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Section 102(b)(7) authorizes a corporation’s certificate of
incorporation to contain:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of
a director to the corporation or its stockholders for
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a
director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate
or limit the liability of a director: (i) [f]or any breach of
the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title [director
liability for unlawful dividends]; or (iv) for any transaction
from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the
liability of a director for any act or omission occurring
prior to the date when such provision becomes effective.
All references in this paragraph to a director shall also be
deemed to refer to such other person or persons, if any,
who, pursuant to a provision of the certificate of
incorporation in accordance with § 141(a) of this title
[authorizing the certificate to delegate board powers and
functions to “such person or persons as shall be provided
in the certificate of incorporation”], exercise or perform
any of the powers or duties otherwise conferred or
39
imposed upon the board of directors by this title.
Consistent with the Delaware legislature’s penchant for old40
fashioned, complicated drafting, section 102(b)(7) reflects the
style of the “lawyer’s cha-cha” (one step forward and two steps
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095 (1968) (footnote omitted);
see also MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, D&O LIABILITY HANDBOOK § I:3
(footnotes omitted) (“Despite the growing sensitivity in the last three decades to
the general problem of corporate governance and to the special problem of
managerial responses to hostile takeovers and deep recessions, the short list of
such cases compiled by Professor Bishop in 1968 has not been swelled by an influx
of new decisions. The traditional judicial reticence towards validating duty of care
claims persists, and the courts remain reluctant to assign personal liability to
directors except in cases where there is at least an undertone of breach of the duty
of loyalty.”).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).
40. The Delaware Supreme Court has stated of the vaunted Delaware LLC
Act: “To understand the overall structure and thrust of the Act, one must wade
through provisions that are prolix, sometimes oddly organized, and do not always
flow evenly.” Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999); see
also State ex rel. Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., No. C.A. 95M-02-017WTQ, 1996 WL 946043, at *1 n.2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 1996) (noting a
shortcoming of “the legislative gurus of the corporate bar”).
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back). The section nowhere mentions the duty of care, but once
the exceptions are cleared away the gravamen of the protection is
clear. As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court, “[W]here the
factual basis for a claim solely implicates a violation of the duty of
care, this court has indicated that the protections of [a section
102(b)(7)] charter provision may properly be invoked and
41
applied.” Or, as explained by two of the leading commentators
on Delaware law, “‘[T]he purpose of § 102(b)(7) is to enable
corporations to eliminate director liability for money damages for
42
duty of care violations . . . .’”
In theory, section 102(b)(7) is merely permissive. In practice,
its invocation has been widespread, even ubiquitous, perhaps
standard. Writing in 2005, retired Chief Justice Veasey stated:
“[P]ersonal liability of directors solely for due care violations has
largely become moot by reason of section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL
43
[Delaware General Corporation Law].”
Initially, it was unclear how far section 102(b)(7) went to
eliminate meaningful sanctions for incompetent behavior by
directors. The pivotal question was the meaning under section
44
102(b)(7) of “not in good faith.” Some Delaware cases referred
to a “triad” of director duties—not only loyalty and care but also
45
“good faith.” Plaintiff lawyers theorized that fiduciary good faith
41.
42.

Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1224.
R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, BALOTTI AND FINKELSTEIN’S
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.13[B] (quoting
Rothenberg v. Santa Fe Pac. Corp., No. 11749, slip op. at 10 n.6 (Del. Ch. May 18,
1992)).
43. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1428 (2005).
44. Almost twenty years after the enactment of section 102(b)(7), the
Chancellor of the vaunted Delaware Court of Chancery “observed, after surveying
the sparse case law on the subject, that both the meaning and the contours of the
duty to act in good faith were ‘[s]hrouded in the fog of . . . hazy jurisprudence.’”
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63 n.98 (Del. 2006) (citation
omitted).
45. E.g., Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90 (“The directors of Delaware
corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good
faith.”). Whatever this “good faith” meant was different than the good faith
mentioned in section 141 of the Delaware Code. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)
(2010) (authorizing directors to rely “in good faith” on certain information); see
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (“To rebut the [business judgment] rule, a
shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that directors, in
reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their
fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty or due care.”).

2012]

THE GLUE OF CAPITALISM

753

might involve some elements of at least process due care—i.e.,
attention to one’s task as a director. If so, there would be at least
some holes in section 102(b)(7)’s insulation of incompetents.
The high water mark of this theory was the protracted Disney
litigation. In Brehm v. Eisner (part of that litigation), the Delaware
Supreme Court stated, “Irrationality . . . may tend to show that the
decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the
46
business judgment rule.” This statement suggested a way through
the shield of section 102(b)(7). If incompetent behavior could be
characterized as irrational, plaintiffs might have their day (or days)
in court.
Indeed, the next time the Disney litigation reached the
Delaware Supreme Court, the plaintiffs (appellants) asked the
court “to treat a failure to exercise due care as a failure to act in
good faith,” that is “to conflate these two duties and declare that a
breach of the duty to be properly informed violates the duty to act
47
in good faith.” That holding would have put a major hole in the
section 102(b)(7) shield, and the supreme court declined to do so.
Actually, given the particular facts of the case, the
interpretative issue was moot. According to the court, even
accepting appellants’ definition of good faith:
[T]he outcome would be no different, because, as the
Chancellor and we now have held, the appellants failed to
establish any breach of the duty of care. To say it
differently, even if the Chancellor’s definition of bad faith
were erroneous, the error would not be reversible because
the appellants cannot satisfy the very test they urge us to
48
adopt.
Undeterred by the specter of dicta, however, the court
proceeded to opine on the meaning of fiduciary good faith:
[O]ur analysis of the appellants’ bad faith claim could
end at this point. In other circumstances it would. This
case, however, is one in which the duty to act in good faith
has played a prominent role, yet to date is not a welldeveloped area of our corporate fiduciary law. Although
the good faith concept has recently been the subject of
considerable scholarly writing, which includes articles
focused on this specific case, the duty to act in good faith
46.
47.
48.

Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264.
In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 63.
Id.
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is, up to this point[,] relatively uncharted. Because of the
increased recognition of the importance of good faith,
some conceptual guidance to the corporate community
may be helpful. For that reason we proceed to address
49
the merits of the appellants’ second argument.
The court’s analysis was driven by section 102(b)(7) and also
section 145, which prescribes standards for indemnification and
also excepts from protection actions not “in good faith.” Noting a
possible continuum including conduct intended to harm the
corporation, gross negligence, and conscious disregard of one’s
duties as a director, the court stated:
Section 145, like Section 102(b)(7), evidences the intent
of the Delaware General Assembly to afford significant
protections to directors . . . of Delaware corporations. To
adopt a definition that conflates the duty of care with the
duty to act in good faith by making a violation of the
former an automatic violation of the latter, would nullify
those legislative protections and defeat the General
Assembly’s intent. There is no basis in policy, precedent
or common sense that would justify dismantling the
50
distinction between gross negligence and bad faith.
The court then adopted the chancellor’s non-exhaustive
description of the fiduciary duty of good faith:
The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes
not simply the duties of care and loyalty . . . but all actions
49. Id. at 63–64.
50. Id. at 66 (citations omitted). The court’s conflation of sections 145 and
102(b)(7) overlooks a key distinction between the two sections. The constraints
on indemnification under section 145 are greater than the constraints on
exculpation under section 102(b)(7). To qualify for indemnification, a person
must not only have “acted in good faith” but also “in a manner the person
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2010). No such limitation exists
under section 102(b)(7). Also, under section 145 a further constraint exists where
the claim triggering indemnification is “by or in the right of the corporation” (the
situation when a director’s incompetence is at issue):
[N]o indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, issue or
matter as to which such person shall have been adjudged to be liable to
the corporation unless and only to the extent that the Court of Chancery
or the court in which such action or suit was brought shall determine
upon application that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of
all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably
entitled to indemnity for such expenses which the Court of Chancery or
such other court shall deem proper.
Id. § 145(b). Again, section 102(b)(7) contains no comparable requirement.
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required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. A
failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance,
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other
than that of advancing the best interests of the
corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to
violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties. There may
be other examples of bad faith yet to be proven or
51
alleged, but these three are the most salient.
Thus, as interpreted by Disney, section 102(b)(7) banished due
care liability from Delaware corporate law—except for
52
circumstances reminiscent of the famous widow Pritchard. The
next significant “good faith” case essentially confirmed that point.
In Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, the supreme court
considered the board’s oversight function, particularly the question
of “assessing the liability of directors where the directors are
unaware of employee misconduct that results in the corporation
53
being held liable.” The court approved the standard announced
ten years earlier by the court of chancery in In re Caremark
54
International Inc. Derivative Litigation. “A ‘necessary condition’ for
director oversight liability . . . [is] a sustained or systematic failure
of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system
55
exists.”
The Stone court went further, seeking “to clarify a doctrinal
issue that is critical to understanding fiduciary liability” when the
56
“[A]lthough good faith may be
oversight duty is at issue.
described colloquially as part of a ‘triad’ of fiduciary duties that
57
includes the duties of care and loyalty,” strictly speaking no triad

51. In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 67 (emphasis added).
52. Following the death of her husband, Mrs. Pritchard served along with her
two sons as a director of Pritchard & Baird Intermediaries Corp., a reinsurance
agency. She paid no attention whatsoever to the business. They despoiled the
corporation and “spawned their fraud in the backwater of her neglect.” Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 829 (N.J. 1981).
53. 911 A.2d 362, 368–69 (Del. 2006).
54. 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
55. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig.,
698 A.2d at 971).
56. Id. at 369.
57. Id. at 370.
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exists. “[T]he requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary
58
element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”
Thus, section 102(b)(7) provides a shield for incompetence, and
“good faith” opens no hole in the shield unless the incompetence
amounts to disloyalty.
Stone did leave one glimmer of hope for those seeking to
impose liability for director incompetence: “[a] director cannot act
loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith
59
belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.”
Thus, if shareholders could plead and eventually prove extreme
incompetence, they might bring into question the “good faith” of a
director’s “belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best
60
interest.” If so, the shield provided by section 102(b)(7) would
yield.
However, three years after Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court
ended that hope. Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan involved the
heightened duty of care that applies when directors arrange to sell
61
the corporation (part of the so-called “Revlon duties”).
The Court of Chancery [had] decided that “unexplained
inaction” permits a reasonable inference that the
directors may have consciously disregarded their fiduciary
duties. The trial court expressed concern about the speed
with which the transaction was consummated; the
directors’ failure to negotiate better terms; and their
62
failure to seek potentially superior deals.
Narrowly construing the directors’ Revlon duties, the supreme
court emphatically rejected the chancery court’s understanding of
“good faith”:
[T]he record establishes that the directors were
disinterested and independent; that they were generally
aware of the company’s value and its prospects; and that
they considered the offer, under the time constraints
imposed by the buyer, with the assistance of financial and
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
Note that this standard is substantially laxer than the standard for indemnification
under section 145. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63–64
(Del. 2006).
60. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
61. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2009). The
heightened duties were first announced in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
62. Lyondell Chem. Co., 970 A.2d at 237.
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legal advisors. At most, this record creates a triable issue
of fact on the question of whether the directors exercised
due care. There is no evidence, however, from which to
infer that the directors knowingly ignored their
responsibilities, thereby breaching their duty of loyalty.
Accordingly, the directors are entitled to the entry of
63
summary judgment.
Summary judgment was appropriate because the directors had
a section 102(b)(7) shield against claims of incompetence (due
64
care). In addition, the court re-articulated the Revlon doctrine,
rejecting the chancery court’s holding that “directors must engage
actively in the sale process, and they must confirm that they have
obtained the best available price either by conducting an auction,
by conducting a market check, or by demonstrating an impeccable
65
These specific requirements had
knowledge of the market.”
allowed the chancery court to suppose that the “directors did not
66
discharge that ‘known set of [Revlon] ‘duties’.’”
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the chancery court
had misunderstood the dictates of Revlon. “[T]here are no legally
prescribed steps that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon
67
As a result, “the directors’ failure to take any specific
duties.”
steps during the sale process could not have demonstrated a
68
Moreover, the supreme
conscious disregard of their duties.”
court emphasized: “[T]here is a vast differences between an
inadequate or flawed effort to carry out fiduciary duties and a
69
conscious
disregard
for
those
duties.”
Thus, Lyondell reinforced the section 102(b)(7) shield in two
ways: first, the case emphasized that incompetence—no matter how
serious—does not constitute a lack of good faith; second, the case
made the care duties under Revlon far less precise, making a
“conscious disregard” claim effectively impossible even in
circumstances when directors know that something special (and
63. Id.
64. Id. at 239 (“Lyondell’s charter includes an exculpatory provision,
pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), protecting the directors from personal liability
for breaches of the duty of care.”).
65. Id. at 243 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co.
(Lyondell I), No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, at *12, *19 (Del. Ch. July 29,
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Lyondell I at *19).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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70

major) is happening with the corporation.
In sum, twenty-five years after Van Gorkom, section 102(b)(7)
means that there is no civil liability for extreme incompetence
under Delaware corporate law, so long as the directors “go through
the motions” of their tasks with sufficient visibility to negate a claim
71
of “conscious disregard.” If:
• “civil liability [is] a system of incentives designed to encourage
72
or deter future behavior” ;
• the “imposition of liability substantially affects how categories
73
of actors respond to the risks they create or confront” ; and
• it is “obvious . . . that liability rules not only compensate, but
74
also deter” ; then it is equally obvious that the liability rules of
Delaware corporate law provide no deterrence against
75
managerial incompetence.
V. THE DEMISE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE DELAWARE LAW OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
In the United States, fiduciary duty has long been at the core
76
of partnership law. The modern U.S. limited liability company
70. See Robert B. Thompson, The Short but Interesting Life of Good Faith as an
Independent Liability Rule, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 543, 544 (2010/2011) (“In a postLyondell world . . . good faith now seems orphaned in terms of having a liability
function in corporate law.”).
71. The poison continues to spread. See In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *22 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (“That reality also exists
because of the Caremark decision itself, which our Supreme Court has embraced as
setting the liability standard in this context. The Caremark liability standard is a
high one, and requires proof that a director acted inconsistent with his fiduciary
duties and, most importantly, that the director knew he was so acting.”); see also In
re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *10 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 11, 2010) (explaining that because the Caremark test is rooted in the concept
of good faith, “plaintiffs must plead particularized facts showing bad faith”).
72. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 24, at 954.
73. Latin, supra note 23, at 677.
74. Abraham, supra note 22, at 1311.
75. See Jamie L. Kastler, Note, The Problem with Waste: Delaware’s Lenient
Treatment of Waste Claims at the Demand Stage of Derivative Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1899, 1918–19 (2011) (“Delaware courts should remove the current fog of
ambiguity around the waste standard and explicitly state that waste is a part of the
duty of good faith. . . . An explicit ruling that places waste under good faith would
provide a new mechanism for shareholders to hold directors accountable for their
irrational business decisions.”). This change would be an improvement, but is not
likely to occur.
76. DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS §§ 9.7.2, 9.8 (3d ed. 2008); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource
Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1458 (2002) (“[C]ourts predictably
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(LLC) began as a partnership-like structure with a corporate-like
77
liability shield, and of course a limited partnership is a type of
partnership.
78
Delaware crafted its LLC act from its limited partnership act,
and many early Delaware LLC cases concern issues of fiduciary
duty. However, both the Delaware LLC and limited partnership
statutes contain language generally embracing “freedom of
79
contract” and specifically authorizing LLC and partnership
80
Moreover,
agreements to address questions of fiduciary duty.
both statutes create broad exculpatory powers for LLC and
81
partnership agreements.
Initially, Delaware’s limited partnership and LLC statutes
merely authorized a partnership or LLC agreement to restrict
fiduciary duties, and in 2002 the Delaware Supreme Court
explicitly engaged in dicta to warn that “restrict” did not entail
82
In 2004, the Delaware legislature responded,
“eliminate.”
including the word “eliminate” in both statutes and also expressly
83
authorizing broad exculpatory provisions.

impose fiduciary duties in the partnership context.”).
77. KLEINBERGER, supra note 76, at ch. 13.
78. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES:
TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 14.01[2] (1994 & Supp. 2011-1).
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c) (2010) (“It is the policy of this chapter
to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the
enforceability of partnership agreements.”); id. § 18-1101(b) (2010) (same as to
limited liability company agreements).
80. Id. § 17-1101(d) (“To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or
other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to
another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a
partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be expanded or
restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement; provided that
the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.”); id. § 18-1101(c) (same as to limited liability
company agreements).
81. Id. § 17-1101(f) (“A partnership agreement may provide for the limitation
or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties
(including fiduciary duties) of a partner or other person to a limited partnership
or to another partner or to an other person that is a party to or is otherwise bound
by a partnership agreement; provided, that a partnership agreement may not limit
or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of
the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”); id. § 18-1101(e)
(same as to limited liability company agreements).
82. Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 817 A.2d 160, 167–68 (Del.
2002). For a detailed discussion of this decision and the response of the Delaware
legislature, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 78 ¶ 14.05[4][a][i], [ii].
83. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 78 ¶ 14.05[4][a][ii].
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Delaware courts still require clear language to eliminate
84
fiduciary duties. But when the language is clear, so is the effect.
For example, in Fisk Ventures v. Segal, the court stated: “[T]he
Genitrix LLC Agreement eliminates fiduciary duties to the
maximum extent permitted by law by flatly stating that members
have no duties other than those expressly articulated in the
Agreement. Because the Agreement does not expressly articulate
85
fiduciary obligations, they are eliminated.”
Likewise, Delaware courts enforce broad exculpatory
provisions found in LLC and limited partnership agreements. For
example, in Wood v. Baum, the plaintiff alleged that the directors of
an LLC had breached their fiduciary duties by improperly valuing
certain non-performing assets, by executing a series of “related
party transactions,” and by “‘fail[ing] properly to institute,
administer and maintain adequate accounting and reporting
controls, practices and procedures,’ which resulted in a ‘massive
restatement process, an SEC investigation, and loss of substantial
86
The LLC’s operating agreement
access to financial markets.’”
exculpated directors from any liability “except in the case of
87
fraudulent or illegal conduct.” The plaintiff suffered dismissal on
the pleadings, unable to allege with particularity that “the directors
acted with scienter, i.e., that they had ‘actual or constructive
88
knowledge’ that their conduct was legally improper.”
LLCs and limited partnerships rarely involve publicly traded
84. Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516–VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2010) (rejecting the argument of an LLC’s manager that the operating
agreement, by identifying only one fiduciary duty, implicitly disclaimed the
existence of any others; holding that fiduciary duties can be neither restricted nor
eliminated by implication).
85. Fisk Ventures, L.L.C. v. Segal, No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *11
(Del. Ch. May 7, 2008). The Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Myron
Steele, has argued that Delaware should by judicial decision eliminate all fiduciary
duties in Delaware limited liability companies and limited partnerships. For the
author’s views on that notion, see Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Justice Cardozo Was
Right, and Chief Justice Steele Is Wrong, INST. OF DEL. CORP. AND BUS. L. (2011),
http://blogs.law.widener.edu/delcorp/?page_id=335&preview=true (article for
on-line symposium hosted by the Widener Law School’s Institute of Delaware
Corporate and Business Law). For other on-line symposium articles, see
Symposium, Default Fiduciary Duties in LLCs and LPs, INST. OF DEL. CORP. AND BUS.
L. (2011), http://blogs.law.widener.edu/delcorp/on-line-symposium-defaultfiduciary-duties-in-llcs-and-lps/.
86. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 139 (Del. 2008). The discussion of this case
is drawn from BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 78 ¶ 14.05[4][a][ii].
87. Wood, 953 A.2d at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 141.
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enterprises because most such enterprises lose the advantages of
89
partnership tax status. However, LLCs and limited partnerships
play major roles in venture capital arrangements. Here, as in the
corporate realm, Delaware entity law encourages managers to
insulate themselves from liability for incompetent management.
Indeed, the encouragement is even greater in the noncorporate
realm. Under Delaware corporate law, the protection is necessarily
indirect. The duty remains intact; only damage actions are
blocked. In the noncorporate realm, the duty can itself be
eliminated.
VI. LIABILITY (AND DETERRENCE), NO; EXHORTATION, YES
As Delaware law has increasingly disconnected managers from
deterrence, would-be opinion makers have provided a wealth of
90
advice for managers seeking competence. For example, in 2003,
the Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance gave a
speech on “[t]he importance of directors in setting the standards
91
for and being the exemplars of good corporate governance.” He
focused in part on managerial methodology:
Devote the necessary time and prepare. An easy one.
With increased duties and heightened expectations, you
should make sure you have the time to be a director, and
especially an audit committee member. You have to
89. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 78 ¶¶ 16.01–.05. There are, however,
notable exceptions. See Manesh, supra note 1, at 469 (“While almost all publicly
held firms are organized as corporations, [the private equity firms of] Blackstone,
Fortress, and Och-Ziff are each organized as noncorporations–a limited
partnership in the case of Blackstone and limited liability companies in the cases
of Fortress and Och-Ziff.”). Manesh attributes this choice of entity to the greater
power to abnegate fiduciary duty. “Delaware’s noncorporate statutes permit
noncorporate firms to opt out of the fiduciary regime by eliminating such duties
wholesale.” Id. at 470.
90. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 23 (Sept. 23, 2010),
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/CCGReport.pdf [hereinafter NYSE REPORT] (“Given
the far-reaching developments affecting corporate governance and public
company disclosure during the first decade of the 21st century, it should come as
no surprise that during that same time period, various organizations, coalitions
and groups have released corporate governance studies, white papers, and
statements of aspirational ideals of best corporate governance practices. These
documents set forth certain core aspects of corporate governance, as seen by the
various authoring groups.”).
91. Alan L. Beller, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks at the Vanderbilt Directors College (June 10, 2003), in 2003 WL
21515874 (S.E.C.) at *1.
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consider your other responsibilities and then decide
whether you can take on the position. And the number of
directors’ posts you can responsibly (both to yourself and
to the company) accept is now limited.
Putting in the time also means doing the work and the
necessary preparation. It may sound too obvious to say,
but read the disclosure documents and the other
materials supplied by the company in preparation for
meetings. You should also insist that the materials be
provided by the company in time. Board packages, except
for unavoidable last minute developments, shouldn’t be
92
provided 24 or 48 hours before the meeting anymore.
These remarks followed the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, which had resulted from the infamous Enron scandal (and
others as well). More recently, following the 2008 implosion, the
New York Stock Exchange issued a lengthy report on “Corporate
Governance.” Among a lengthy list of recommendations for boards
of directors is the following item, which carries an almost religious
tone:
One fundamental role of the board is to work with the
corporation’s CEO to create a culture of high integrity,
including adherence to both the rule of law and
appropriate ethical standards. This role includes hiring
the corporation’s CEO and senior managers, and taking
such action as is necessary to ensure that basic values such
as honesty, trust, candor and transparency are maintained
throughout the corporation.
Insisting that the
management team create a strong ethical culture is
93
essential to proper risk management and governance.
The American Bar Association has also produced a major work
94
on corporate governance. The report includes a description of
key board functions, attention to which would seem a checklist for
matters a competent director will regularly consider:
Board functions that generally are retained by the board
and are central to their focus include:
 Selecting, monitoring, evaluating, motivating and
92.
93.
94.

Id. at *2.
NYSE REPORT, supra note 90, at 27.
CORP. GOVERNANCE COMM., A.B.A., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
DELINEATION OF GOVERNANCE ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES (Aug. 1, 2009), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL260000pub/materials/2009
0801/delineation-final.pdf.
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compensating, and when necessary replacing the CEO
and other key members of senior management;
 Monitoring corporate performance and assessing
whether the corporation is being appropriately
managed by the senior management team;
 Providing strategic guidance to the senior management
team and reviewing and approving financial objectives
and major corporate plans and actions;
 Developing corporate policy;
 Reviewing and approving major changes in auditing
and accounting principles and practices;
 Overseeing audit, internal controls, risk management
and ethics and compliance;
 In a public company, overseeing financial reporting
and related disclosures;
 Declaring dividends and approving share repurchase
programs;
 Making decisions on major transactions and other
material events concerning the corporation for
submission to the shareholders for approval; and
 Performing any other functions prescribed by law,
regulation or listing rule, or the corporation’s
95
certificate of incorporation or bylaws.
The report also contains fine-sounding sentiments on director
duties:
In fulfilling their mandate, directors are required to act
under the high standards imposed on fiduciaries,
including the duties to act with due care (focusing
appropriate attention and making decisions on an
informed basis), with good faith and in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders. Directors owe
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and the
shareholder body as a whole. The duty of care requires
that directors inform themselves of “all material
information reasonably available to them” concerning a
given decision prior to acting on that decision . . . .
Directors are obligated to act in a deliberative and fully
informed manner and this requires access to relevant and
timely information. One of the very practical challenges
in corporate governance relates to the difference between
95.

Id. at 8–9.
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managers and directors in their access to information
about the corporation and the implications of this
difference on the ability of part-time outside directors to
hold managers accountable for the responsibilities that
have been delegated to them. . . . Nonetheless,
“[d]irectors must make reasonable efforts to ensure that
they are being kept appropriately apprised of the
company’s compliance with the law and its business
96
performance . . . .”
97
Other examples could be easily found. But to what end? If
exhortation sufficed to inspire good conduct, none of us would be
sinners.
Consider an analogy from the U.S. law of lawyers. For many
years, the American Bar Association had a Code of Professional
Responsibility, which was implemented in many states. The Code
was divided into Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules.
The former were aspirational; violation of the latter could bring
real sanctions. After much debate, the ABA eventually abandoned
its dichotomous code, recognizing the aspirations without sanctions
were only so much verbiage. The Code’s replacement, the Rules of
Professional Conduct, contains only enforceable disciplinary
98
rules.
96.
97.

Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
See, e.g., COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N,
ENTERPRISE RISK MGMT.-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: EXEC. SUMMARY 2 (Sept. 2004),
http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf
(defining enterprise risk management as “a process, effected by an entity’s board
of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the
entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives”), quoted in Michelle M.
Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in the
Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 46 (2010); Tina Chi, Corporate Governance:
Boards Urged to Give Risk Oversight Duties to All Committees in Light of Dodd-Frank, 42
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1948, 1948 (Oct. 18, 2010) (“In light of heightened
legislative scrutiny of corporate risk oversight, all public company boards need to
ensure that the responsibility for managing risks is dispersed appropriately among
directors and their committees, and not unduly given to audit committees, leading
corporate governance experts said Oct. 7 at a Practising Law Institute conference
in New York.”).
98. Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics
of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the
Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 421 (2005) (footnotes omitted) (describing “the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility, which separated the general (entitled
‘canons’ and ‘ethical considerations’) from the mandatory minimums
(‘disciplinary rules’) and . . . the Rules of Professional Conduct, which eliminated
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In a culture that generally backs competence standards with
liability risks, why expect managers to respond to mere
exhortation? Consider, as a further illustration, the insouciance of
then Citigroup CEO, Charles Prince, when asked about liquidity
risks before the bubble burst in 2008:
Regulatory agencies and industry organizations . . . began
warning of liquidity issues in the financial markets in late
2006 and early 2007.
When asked about these
warnings, . . . Prince responded: “When the music stops,
in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as
long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and
99
dance. We’re still dancing . . . .”
So long as Delaware law insulates incompetence from liability:
(1) the law encourages insouciance rather than business judgment;
and (2) all the exhortations to best practices will be but a “toothless
100
tiger.”
VII. THE CONCEPTUAL ERRORS UNDERLYING DELAWARE’S EROSION
OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Two major conceptual errors underlie the erosion of personal
responsibility in the Delaware law of entities. The first involves the
over-extension of contract notions, and the second involves an
overly narrow conception of the law of torts.
Delaware increasingly hues to “contractarian” notions in both
corporate and unincorporated law. Part V of this essay discussed
the role of “freedom of contract” within LLCs and limited
partnerships. In Delaware case law, that role sometimes looms so
large as to obscure the fact that an LLC owes its liability shield to an
act of the sovereign. For example, in In re Seneca Investments, LLC,
the court stated that “[a]n LLC is primarily a creature of
101
contract,” and in Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, the court stated that
the broadly moral altogether”).
99. Harner, supra note 97, at 45 (citations omitted).
100. The Model Business Corporation Act provides another example of the
dichotomy of aspirations and liability. Section 8.30 of the Model Business
Corporation Act states “standards of conduct for directors,” breach of which one
might expect to produce liability (assuming damages). MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.30 (2005). But “standards of liability for directors” appear separately, in section
8.31, are more lax than the conduct standards, and thus make the conduct
standards merely precatory. See id. § 8.31.
101. In re Seneca Invs. LLC, 970 A.2d 259, 261 (Del. Ch. 2008) (emphasis
added).
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“limited liability companies . . . are creatures not of the state but of
102
contract.”
The current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court is so
enamored of the contractarian view of unincorporated entities that
he has re-written the history of fiduciary duty. In a 2007 article,
Chief Justice Steele stated:
[We must] come to grips with the reality that the
contractual relationship between parties to limited
partnership and limited liability company agreements
should be the analytical focus for resolving governance
disputes—not the status relationship of the parties. When
the parties specify duties and liabilities in their agreement,
the courts should resist the temptation to superimpose
upon those contractual duties common law fiduciary duty
103
principles analogized from the law of corporate governance.
But fiduciary duty within limited partnerships and LLCs does
not come from corporate law. Rather, under U.S. law (including
the law of Delaware), the partnership relationship has always been
104
Especially in Delaware, the LLC is in
characterized as fiduciary.
105
Therefore, to
the partnership tradition, not the corporate one.
characterize fiduciary duties in limited partnerships and limited
liability companies as an analogy from corporate governance is
simply wrong.
The reach of contract into corporation law is illustrated in the
106
The case arose when a
recent case of Nemec v. Shrader.
corporation redeemed the stock of two former senior “partners” of
107
Had the former
the firm in anticipation of a major deal.
102. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 (Del.
Ch. May 7, 2008) (footnote omitted).
103. Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 25 (2007)
(emphasis added).
104. E.g., Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, No. 16297, 2000 WL 307370, at
*21–22 (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 2000) (presupposing that general partners owe
fiduciary duties; discussing when limited partners might also owe fiduciary duties);
Continental Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., No. 15539, 1999 WL 66528, at *5 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 26, 1999) (holding that the fiduciary duty inherent in a limited partnership
did not arise before the formation of the partnership).
105. The Delaware LLC Act is modeled on the Delaware Limited Partnership
Act. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 78, ¶ 14.01[2].
106. Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2010).
107. Id. at 1123.
Booz Allen [the corporation at issue] was founded as a partnership in
1914, but later changed its legal structure and became a Delaware
corporation. Booz Allen retained, however, the attitude and culture of a
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“partners” remained shareholders, their payout from the deal
108
would have been $60 million more than the redemption price.
The “partners” alleged breach of fiduciary duty and of the
109
The
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Delaware Supreme Court held that contract can supplant fiduciary
duty, even in a purely corporate context:
It is a well-settled principle that where a dispute arises
from obligations that are expressly addressed by contract,
that dispute will be treated as a breach of contract claim.
In that specific context, any fiduciary claims arising out of
the same facts that underlie the contract obligations
110
would be foreclosed as superfluous.
The hegemony of contract is a triumph of contract over
property law.
The shift in perspectives means a shift in
responsibilities and remedies.
“Fiduciary relationships are
commonly characterized by one party placing property or authority
in the hands of another, or being authorized to act on behalf of the
111
Once courts stop thinking about managers as handling
other.”
other people’s money, the way is open to abandon “the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive” and decay into “the morals of the
112
As asserted in Part I, “dog eat dog” among firms
market place.”
may make for a competitive market. “Dog eat dog” within an entity
undercuts capitalism.
The tort-related error involves a simplistic notion of
negligence claims. Consider Judge Winter’s automobile analogy:
Whereas an automobile driver who makes a mistake in
partnership, owned and led by a relatively small cadre of corporate
officers, who were referred to as the ‘partners.’”

Id.
108. Id. at 1130.
109. Id. at 1125.
110. Id. at 1129.
111. High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, 234 P.3d 747, 752 (Idaho 2010)
(quoting Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 150 P.3d 288, 296 (Idaho 2006)).
112. The quoted words are from Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Meinhard v.
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928), in which he famously distinguished
between relations inter se co-owners of a business and relations between businesses:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior.
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judgment as to speed or distance injuring a pedestrian will
likely be called upon to respond in damages, a corporate
officer who makes a mistake in judgment as to economic
conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency
will rarely, if ever, be found liable for damages suffered by
113
the corporation.
Judge Winter justifies this distinction in several ways including
the inability of courts to effectively judge business judgment, the
need for directors to make time-pressured decisions in conditions
of imperfect information, and the fact that risk-taking is essential to
114
These facts argue caution in judging directors’
profit-making.
competence but not complete abstention. In particular, these facts
have little to say about judging the methodology of director
decision making.
Consider another version of the automobile analogy. Suppose
it is necessary that a person drive in a dangerous snowstorm. Vision
will be limited, and the risks of accident are great. If the driver
chooses one road over another and ends up in a ditch, we should
not blame the driver. However, might we not inquire whether the
driver took elementary precautions before beginning the
necessarily risky journey—such as obtaining a current roadmap,
making sure the car had snow tires or chains, the windshield wipers
worked, and there was an adequate amount of windshield washer
fluid?
While it is true that “[c]ourts are ill-fitted . . . to judge
115
Delaware courts in
appropriate degrees of business risk,”
particular have fashioned several “process-related” standards for
judging director methodology. For example, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co. contains a now-venerable standard for judging the way
directors decide to adopt defensive methods in the face of a
116
Revlon and its progeny did likewise for
possible takeover bid.
directors “putting the company for sale,” at least until Lyondell
dismantled the methodology in order to buttress section 102(b)(7).
The plethora of “best practices” documents (discussed above
in Part VI) provide a starting point to return the duty of care to
Delaware law. The need is not to second guess decisions but rather

113. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982).
114. Id. at 885–86.
115. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting Lewis v.
Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997)).
116. 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).
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to vet the process of director decision making. At least according
to the New York Stock Exchange, well-meaning directors spend
much time learning proper methodology:
Not surprisingly, and as with the widespread
developments in law affecting governance and related
disclosure obligations, corporations’ management and
directors have felt a need to stay current with these
statements of best practices in the last decade so that they
are not seen as falling behind the curve with respect to
corporate governance matters.
Director education
programs have proliferated, in an effort to bring the
117
classroom into the boardroom. . . .
Courts should be competent to evaluate whether directors
118
have at least managed a passing grade.
VIII. THE WAGES OF SIN: INCREASING FEDERAL CONTROL OF PRIVATE
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
Revitalizing Delaware’s duty of care would require a revision to
section 102(b)(7), which is exceedingly unlikely. However, the
alternative will be an increasing federal intervention into corporate
governance. Although Delaware’s Chief Justice is sanguine about
119
the ability of Delaware law to withstand federalization, other
117. NYSE REPORT, supra note 90, at 23 (footnote omitted).
118. In the words of a leading treatise on Delaware corporate law:
Even if the courts are not completely comfortable reassessing the merits of
the directors’ decision, Van Gorkom and other decisions illustrate the
courts’ willingness to review the process the directors used to reach their
decision. For example, if a target board does not fully consider an offer,
or if its consideration of the offer is merely a sham, a court may find that
the directors violated their fiduciary duty. The courts’ examination of
due care focuses on a board’s decision-making process: “We look for
evidence as to whether a board has acted in a deliberate and
knowledgeable way in identifying and exploring alternatives. Within the
context of this analysis, we are, of course, ever mindful of the realities of
corporate directorship.”
1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, BALOTTI AND FINKELSTEIN’S
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.15 (footnotes
omitted).
119. Veasey, supra note 29, at 2.
The [Dodd-Frank Act] will have a sweeping regulatory effect on business,
particularly banking, and will have some effect on corporate governance.
Mercifully, that latter effect, in itself, will be only marginally intrusive, but
nevertheless, it is a federal intrusion that is undesirable as a matter of
principle. It will not, however, constitute a wholesale federal preemption
of corporate law and corporate governance.
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observers claim that substantial federalization has already
120
For example: “In an apparent effort to restore
occurred.
directors’ adherence to their fiduciary duty, Sarbanes-Oxley
imposes responsibilities on directors similar to the responsibilities
required under state corporate fiduciary law, appearing to
121
‘federalize’ that law.”
Moreover, creative lawyers are already turning federal
disclosure requirements into surrogates for state law negligence
claims. In September 2010, a federal district court declined to
dismiss a securities fraud claim that alleged, in essence, that AIG
and its directors had mislead investors by falsely claiming
122
managerial competence.
Id.
120. For a cynical view of what is happening, see Renee M. Jones, The Role of
Good Faith in Delaware: How Open-Ended Standards Help Delaware Preserve Its Edge, 55
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 499 (2010/2011) (recognizing a connection between
Delaware’s interpretation of good faith and federal intervention).
121. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 400 (2005).
Sarbanes-Oxley adds teeth to the directors’ obligation by creating some
greater specificity regarding this duty. Moreover, these requirements
regulate the internal operations of corporate boards in a manner
traditionally reserved to the states. In this way, Sarbanes-Oxley not only
federalizes corporate fiduciary duties, but also adds substance to them.
This federalization represents an attempt to restore directors’ fidelity to
their fiduciary duties.
Id. at 404–05 (footnote omitted); see also Adam M. Fliss, The Pendulum Swings:
Federalization of Corporate Law and Its Effects on the American Capital Markets, 41
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 899, 899 (2008) (“Federal courts have aided Sarbanes’
intrusions into state corporate law by creating, enforcing, and broadly interpreting
new rules that effectively supplant well-established state corporate law.”).
122. In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511, 530–31
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). The court explained:
Plaintiffs’ allegations . . . are adequate to plead material misstatements
and omissions on the part of AIG and the section 10(b) Defendants
throughout the Class Period.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges with
particularity that AIG and the section 10(b) Defendants, through AIG’s
SEC filings, press releases, and investor conferences, beginning with the
Company’s 2005 Form 10-K and continuing through the Company’s
capital raising in May 2008, materially misled the market in the following
ways: (i) failing to disclose the scope of AIGFP’s expansive underwriting
of CDSs in 2005; (ii) failing to disclose that up to 75% of the cash
collateral of the securities lending program was invested in RMBS; (iii)
falsely stating that the Company engaged in extensive due diligence
before entering into swap contracts; (iv) repeatedly emphasizing the
strength of the Company’s risk controls when addressing investor
concerns related to exposure to the subprime mortgage market, without
disclosing that the CDS portfolio at AIGFP was in fact not subject to
either the risk control processes that governed other divisions of the
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In light of the radical effect of section 102(b)(7) and the
“freedom of contract” excesses of Delaware’s unincorporated law, it
is ironic to read a statement by Delaware’s former Chief Justice that
“[t]he bottom line is that the Dodd-Frank Act does not alter or
eliminate the protections traditionally provided to directors by the
123
Delaware law has gone far beyond
business judgment rule.”
those traditional protections, replacing fiduciary duty with contract
and thereby, as a practical matter, entirely insulating those who
manage other people’s money from responsibility even for
sustained and substantial incompetence. The results cannot be
good for a market-based economy.

Company or the risk control processes that previously had been in place
at AIGFP; (v) repeatedly pronouncing confidence in the Company’s
assessment of the risks presented by the CDS portfolio, despite
knowledge that the Company’s models were incapable of evaluating the
risks presented; (vi) stating that the Company had the ability to hedge its
CDS portfolio when in fact it was not economically feasible to do so; (vii)
leading investors to believe that the primary risk presented by the CDS
portfolio was credit risk, when in fact the CDS portfolio entailed
tremendous collateral risk and valuation risk; (viii) expressing
confidence at the December 5, 2007, investor conference in their
estimates related to losses in the CDS portfolio despite a warning from
PwC that the Company may have a material weakness in assessing that
portfolio; and (ix) leading investors to believe that the Company was
raising capital in May 2008 to take advantage of opportunities in the
marketplace when, in fact, the capital was necessary to meet billions of
dollars’ worth of collateral obligations triggered by recent downgrades of
the Company’s credit rating and the credit ratings of CDOs on which
AIG had sold protection. Each of these allegations of misstatements and
omissions plausibly and with particularity frames a claim of concealment
of either a significant decision taken by the Company to expose itself to
risk or a significant weakness in the Company’s risk controls that “would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the total mix of information made available.”

Id.
123.

Veasey, supra note 29, at 2 (emphasis added).

